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Ever since pre-classical Antiquity, peace treaties have been important instruments for ending 
wars as well as for the political and legal organisation of international communities. Peace 
treaties were of particular importance to Europe and the West between 1500 and 1920. The 
relative number of wars which were ended through peace treaties steadily rose from less than 
half in the 16
th




 Peace treaties 
played a primary role in the formation of Europe’s classical law of nations (1500-1815) and 
the West’s modern international law (1815-1920). Historians have long since acknowledged 
that the string of peace treaties that runs from Westphalia (1648) to Versailles (1919) formed 
the backbone of Europe’s international constitution. These and other peace treaties laid down 
some foundational principles of international order, such as religious neutrality, the common 
responsibility of States for upholding peace and stability, the special role of great powers 
therein and the balance of power.
3
 But peace treaties are also an informative and constitutive 
source of two essential, specific branches of international law, the law of treaties and the jus 
post bellum. To these two aspects of the contribution peace treaties made to international law, 
scholars have devoted far less attention than they deserve. Particularly the latter is of great 
importance for the study of international law and for understanding its impact on people’s 
lives. The jus post bellum forms the third logical part, next to the jus ad bellum (use of force 
law) and the jus in bello (the laws of war) of what was historically known as the jus belli ac 
                                                 
1
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pacis (laws of war and peace).
4
 Between the 16
th
 and the 20
th
 centuries, a large body of law 
on the ending of war and the restoration of peace was articulated in peace treaties.  
 
2. Classical and medieval peace treaties 
 
The Roman usage and customs of peace treaty making were informed by Greek practices, 
which in turn drew on those of the pre-classical civilisations of the Middle East. By 
consequence, ancient peace treaty practice shows a remarkable continuity.
5
  
 All through Antiquity, peace treaties were primarily oral agreements. The constitutive 
element of their binding character was the mutual oath undertaken by treaty partners. 
Typically, the oath would include an invocation to the gods to act as witnesses and guarantors 
of the treaty. Already in pre-classical times, there are examples of treaties negotiated by 
ambassadors, which where later ratified by oath by the rulers. The Romans distinguished 
between foedera and sponsiones. A foedus was the traditional form of a treaty whereby the 
Roman people bound itself. Initially, it was sworn to by fetial priests through an elaborate 
ritual, committing Jupiter, the supreme deity, to the treaty. The fetials would only act after a 
positive decision of the Senate. Later, they were replaced by magistrates, and ultimately by 
the emperor. A sponsio was an agreement entered into by Roman magistrates, often 
commanders in the field, at their own initiative. It had to be ratified by the Senate and people 
of Rome. The Romans reserved the right not to ratify these engagements, under the condition 
that they surrendered the magistrate who made the sponsio. In Antiquity, peace treaties were 
commonly written down and published on pillars or tablets. Its recording was not constitutive 
to the treaty but served as proof for the treaty text and was a way of making it known. The 
Greeks, and through their influence, the Romans, also developed the concept of faith (πίστίς, 
                                                 
4
 Cicero (106-43 BC), Pro Balbo 6.15. 
5
 C Baldus, ‘Vestigia pacis. The Roman peace treaty: structure or event?’ in R Lesaffer (ed) Peace Treaties and 
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Treaties in Antiquity’ (1995) 29 Israel Law Review 233-49: idem, ‘Friedensverträge im römischen Altertum’ 
(1989) 27 Archiv des Völkerrechts 45-62. 
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fides) to the given word as a foundation for the binding character and the strict upholding of a 
treaty. 
 Ancient peoples distinguished between peace treaties and armistices. Greek peace 
treaties were almost always made for a limited time. The Romans reserved the term pax 
(peace) for the state of peace, to be distinguished from the state of war. The peace treaty itself 
they would refer to as foedus pacis.
6
 Indutiae was the term used for armistices. Until the early 
3
rd
 century BC, the Romans would use indutiae for peace treaties limited in time, which 
restored the state of peace for a long period. After that, the term indutiae gained its meaning 
as a treaty suspending hostilities but not ending the state of war or restoring the state of 
peace.
7
 The glossator Accursius († 1263) distinguished between indutiae, armistices only 




 Ancient peace treaties were brief and, with the Greeks and the Roman, clauses were 
standardised. In ancient peace treaties, the three main categories of clauses that could later be 
found in (early-)modern peace treaties can already be distinguished: first, clauses dealing 
with the issues underlying the war; second, clauses ending the state of war, thus reflecting 
upon the past; and third, clauses restoring and safeguarding the state of peace, thus referring 
to the future. Just like early-modern peace treaties, ancient peace treaties often included 
stipulations on prisoners of war. In this context, the Roman jus postliminii should be 
mentioned. The jus postliminii implied that Roman citizens who were taken captive by the 
enemy and lost their citizenship and all their property, regained their rights upon their return. 
The Greeks introduced general peace treaties, which did not only involve the actual 
belligerents but extended to third powers. These treaties included the provision that all 
powers involved would commonly act against the perpetrator of a breach of treaty. 
                                                 
6
 Isidorus of Seville (c. 560-636), Etymologiae 5.6. 
7
 See Aulus Gellius (2
nd
 c. BC), Noctes Atticae 1.25.4: ‘neque pax est indutiae – bellum enim manet, pugna 
cessat’ (‘and an armistice is neither peace – for the state of war endures; fighting stops’, my transl.). KH Ziegler, 
‘Kriegsverträge im antiken römischen Recht’ (1985) 100 Savigny Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte, 
Romanistische Abteilung 40-90. 
8
 Glossa Paciscuntur ad D. 2.14.5: ‘ut treugas, quae sunt in longum tempus. Item inducias, quae sunt in breve’ 
(‘such as truces, which are made for a long time. Further armistices, which are made for a short time’) and 
Glossa Lacessant ad 49.15.19.1: ‘(…) Sed treugae in longum, et dicuntur foedera (‘But truces are for a long 
time, and they are called treaties’). Also Glossa Foederati ad D. 49.15.7. 
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 The Roman practices of peacemaking did not disappear with the fall of the Roman 
Empire in the West (476 AD). They lived on through the Early Middle Ages, in the practices 
of the Byzantine Empire, the Germanic successor kingdoms and the Islamic world.
9
 
All through the Middle Ages, ratification by oath remained the foundational stone of 
the binding character of treaties. In the Latin West, oaths were taken in Church whereby the 
Holy Gospel, the Holy Cross, the Eucharist or relics were touched. Under canon law, the 
enforcement of treaties fell under the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts, as the breaking of a 
promise was a sin. This was all the more true for treaties confirmed by oath, as perjury was 
considered an even more grave sin.
10




 centuries, princes would often 
expressly subject themselves to ecclesiastical or papal jurisdiction and sanctions, up to 
excommunication.
11
 In some peace treaties, princes renounced the possibility of denouncing 
their oath as invalid and requesting the pope for dispensation from their oath.
12
 
 The learned jus commune of Roman and canon law contributed to the development of 
a doctrine of peacemaking from the late 11
th
 century onwards. The laws of war and peace did 
not form an autonomous body of law with its own literature. Roman and canon lawyers 
would comment upon issues relating to war and peace at appropriate places in their general 




 centuries, self-standing treatises on matters of war and 
peace would appear. Treatises on peace treaties were few and far in between.
13
 
Justinian’s (527-565) collection of Roman law held scant evidence of Roman peace 
treaty practice. Most relevant was title D. 49.15 De captivis et postliminio et redemptis ab 
hostibus from the Digest which informed about the distinction between foedera and indutiae 
and about postliminium. Therefore, Roman jurisprudence could add little knowledge to what 
had remained from Roman peace treaty practice all over the Middle Ages, but the inclusion 
of this information in the Digest allowed the civilians to elaborate on these subjects. The 
presence of the Pax Constantiae of 1183, a treaty between Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa 
(1158-1191) and the Lombard League, in the medieval collection of the Justinian codification 
                                                 
9
 B Paradisi, ‘L’organisation de la paix au IVe et Ve siècles’ in B Paradisi, Civitas maxima. Studi di storia del 
diritto internazionale 1 (2vols. Olschki Florence 1974) 236-95. 
10
 Decretal Novit Ille by Innocent III (1198-1216) in Liber Extra (1234) X. 2.1.13. 
11
 Eg Etaples (3 November 1492) Art. 28 in J Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens 3-2 (8 
vols., Brunel Amsterdam 1726-1731) 294-5, hereinafter CUD. 
12
 Eg Soleuvre (13 September 1475) in fine 3-2 CUD 508.  
13
 Most significant is Martinus Garatus Laudensis, De confoederatione, pace et conventionibus principum (15
th
 
century) A Wijffels (ed) in Peace Treaties and International Law (n 5) 412-47. 
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spurred off some writings on peace treaties.
14
 But by far the most significant contribution of 
the medieval civilians to the development of a doctrine of the law of peacemaking came 
through the application of Roman private law to peace treaties. To the medieval mind, this 
was not a ‘transplant’ but a self-evident application of the law at large on what was just 
another category of contracts. During the Middle Ages, sovereignty – superiorem non 
recognoscens or the non-recognition of a superior – was a relative concept and extended to a 
variety of rulers and communities including kings, feudal lords and vassals, clerical 
institutions, towns and even rural communities. The right to use force and make peace was 
not restricted to supreme princes such as the pope, emperor or kings. Consequentially, there 
was no strict distinction between public and private peacemaking. Among the contributions 
of medieval civilian doctrine to (peace) treaty making should be mentioned the use of the 
Roman contract of mandatum in the context of diplomatic practice.
15
 
The contribution of canon law to the development of a doctrine of peacemaking was if 
anything more significant than that of Roman law. From Late Antiquity onwards, the Church 
had deferred to Roman law for its own legal organisation. Isidorus’ definition of jus gentium 
(law of nations) with its reference to foedera pacis and indutiae had founds its way into 
Gratian’s Decretum (c. 1140) and thus into classical canon law. The Liber Extra (1234) 
contained a title De treuga et pace,
16





 centuries, treatises on the subject.
17
 The reference to ‘truce and peace’ 




 centuries to limit 
violence through the protection of certain persons and places (pax Dei) and the prohibition to 
fight at certain times (treuga Dei). Undoubtedly the most crucial contribution of medieval 
canon law to the doctrine of treaty law in general and peace treaty making in particular is the 
articulation of the principle ‘pacta sunt servanda’, of the binding character of all contracts and 
                                                 
14
 Baldus de Ubaldis (1327-1400), see Super usibus feudorum et commentum super pace Constantiae (F 
Patavinus Vulterris ed Rome 1474); G Dolezalek, ‘I commentari di Odofredo e Baldo alla pace di Constanza,’ in 
La pace di Costanza 1183 (Cappelli Bologna 1984) 59-75. 
15
 KH Ziegler, ‘The Influence of Medieval Roman Law on Peace Treaties’ in Peace Treaties and International 
Law (n 5) 147-61. 
16
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 Another significant contribution from canon law and late-medieval theology is the 
doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibus. 
The Middle Ages saw the emergence of what has been the normal method of the 
negotiation of peace treaties ever since. Under this method, three different sets of documents 
were produced: the mandates which rulers bestowed upon the representatives who negotiated 
with their counterparts; the treaty text as arrested by these representatives; documents 
attesting the ratification by oath by the rulers themselves. During the Late Middle Ages, these 
documents were commonly made by public notaries and were signed and sealed. It was also 
common for the diplomats to swear an oath to the treaty text, engaging their principals to 
ratify the treaty with their own, subsequent oath. 
By the 13
th
 century, the ratification documents came to serve two purposes. They 
rendered proof of the actual oath taking by the ruler, which remained the main constitutive 
underpinning of the treaty, making it binding and enforceable under canon law. But the 
signing and sealing of the documents had also become a constitutive act, binding the 








 and the 18
th
 centuries, peace treaties grew into far more extensive 
documents than they were before, containing a manifold of legal stipulations relating to the 
ending of war and the restoration of peace. This change was consequential to a change in the 
                                                 
18
 X.1.35.1; R Lesaffer, ‘The Medieval Canon Law of Contract and Early Modern Treaty Law’ (2000) 2 Journal 
of the History of International Law 178-98; KH Ziegler, ‘Biblische Grundlagen des europäischen Völkerrechts’ 
(2000) Savigny Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte, Kanonistische Abteilung 1-32. 
19
 L Bittner, Die Lehre von den völkerrechtlichen Vertragsurkunden (Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 
Stuttgart/Leipzig/Berlin 1924); A Hertz, ‘Medieval Treaty Obligation’ (1991) 6 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law 425-43; A Nussbaum, ‘Forms and Observance of Treaties in the Middle Ages and the Early 
Sixteenth Century’ in GA Lipsky (ed) Law and Politics in the World Community: Essays on Hans Kelsen’s pure 
theory and related issues in international law (University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1953) 191-
6; Influence of Medieval Roman Law (n 15) 152-4. On signed and sealed documents: R Lesaffer, ‘Peace 
Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia’ in Peace Treaties and International Law (n 5) 9-44 at 25-7; H Steiger 
‘Bemerkungen zum Friedensvertrag von Crépy en Laonnais vom 18. September 1544 zwischen Karl V. und 
Franz I.’ in U Beyerlin, M Bothe, R Hofmann and EU Petersmann (eds) Recht zwischen Umbruch und 
Bewahrhung: Völkerrecht – Europarecht – Staatsrecht. Festschrift für Rudolf Bernhardt 2 (2 vols. Springer 
Berlin 1995) 249-65 at 256-60. 
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realities and concept of war after 1500. The rise of the modern State and the gradual 
monopolisation of war by sovereign rulers transformed wars from a contest between princes 
and their allies and adherents to an all-out war between territorial States, making them more 
encompassing and more disruptive of normal relations between rulers and their respective 
subjects. This change of the reality of war was mirrored in doctrine. Under the medieval just 
war theory, war was perceived of as an instrument of justice. It was the forcible self-help of a 
wronged party against the perpetrator of a prior injury. As such, the war was limited in its 
scope and goals to retribution for the wrong committed and compensation of the costs and 









saw the rise of a second concept of war: that of legal war (bellum legale) or formal war 
(bellum solemne). The concept, which was clearly spelled out by 16
th
- and early 17
th
-century 
writers such as Baltasar de Ayala (1548-84), Alberico Gentili (1552-1608) and Hugo Grotius 
(1583-1645) had antecedents in medieval civilian jurisprudence. For a war to be legal, it had 
to be waged by a sovereign and to be formally declared. In the latter condition lay the ratio 
existendi of the concept. From the 16
th
 century onwards, formal declarations of war grew into 
substantial documents. The declaration of war indicated that from now on a legal state of war 
reigned between the belligerents and their subjects.
21
 By consequence, the laws of peace were 
superseded by the laws of war. Often, the declarations spelled out the consequences of the 
state of war, announcing a series of measures such as the arrest or eviction of enemy subjects, 
the confiscation of their property, the prohibition to pay debts to enemy subjects or their 
confiscation, the prohibition of trade with the enemy and of travel towards enemy territory, 
the eviction of diplomats and the revocation of passports.  
                                                 
20
 J Barnes, ‘The Just War’ in N. Kretzman et alii (eds) The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy 
(CUP Cambridge 1982) 750-84; P Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre just (Presses 
Universitaires de France Paris 1983); FH Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (CUP Cambridge 1975). 
21
 Eg H Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis libri tres (1625) 1.2.1.1: ‘But Custom had so prevailed, that not the Act 
of Hostility, but the State and Situation of the Contending Parties, now goes by the Name; so that War is the 
State or Situation of those (considered in that Respect) who dispute by Force of Arms’. Transl. J Morrice (1738) 
of French edn J Barbeyrac, in H Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace (R Tuck ed Natural Law and 
Enlightenment Classics 3 vols. Liberty Fund Indianapolis 2005). 
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By consequence, peace treaties had to include elaborate regulations to end the state of 
war and restore the state of peace.
22
 As declarations of war marked the beginning of the legal 
state of war and regulated the consequences thereof, peace treaties marked the beginning of 
the state of peace and regulated the consequences thereof.  
Early-modern and modern peace treaties had a similar structure as treaties had held 
before. First, there was a preamble, in which reference was made to past events and in which 
the treaty partners expressed their desire to restore peace and stated their main goals in doing 
so. Second came the material clauses and stipulations. As mentioned before, these can be 
classified under three headings: clauses dealing with the outstanding issues between the 
parties, clauses making an end to the state of war and dealing with its consequences and 
clauses which pertained to the restoration and safeguarding of the state of peace for the 
future. Third, the treaty ended with stipulations about ratification and publication. Regarding 
the state of war, peace treaties would commonly have a general clause about the ending of 
hostilities, an amnesty clause and include stipulations about the withdrawal of troops, 
occupied territory and fortresses, confiscated and sequestered enemy property and assets, pre-
war debts and wartime procedures between enemy subjects, prisoners of war, general and 
particular reprisals, seized documents. Regarding the state of peace, peace treaties would 
have a general clause about the restoration of peace and friendship, including the prohibition 
to harm one another or condone one’s subjects to do so and would further entail stipulations 
on free movement of persons, commerce, navigation, the rights of people living in ceded 
territories, access to justice and protection against arrest and confiscation in case of new war.  
There was another reason why it was necessary to articulate the legal implications of 
war and peace in detail in declarations of war and peace treaties. The 16
th
 and early 17
th
 
centuries were marked by a crisis of the international order of Europe. The Reformation and 
the emergence of the sovereign State destroyed the religious unity of the Latin West and 
struck hard at the last remnants of the universal authority of the emperor and the pope. The 
Reformation caused half of Europe to reject the authority of canon law and the jurisdiction of 
pope and Church. Where canon law once had been the foundational stone of the legal unity of 
the West and the authority on which the jus gentium rested, it now became a cause of 
                                                 
22
 S Whatley (ed) A General Collection of Treatys, Declarations of War, Manifestos, and other Publick Papers, 
Relating to Peace and War, Among the Potentates of Europe, from 1648 to the Present Time (4 vols. Knapton 
etc London 1710-32); R Lesaffer, ‘Defensive Warfare, Prevention and Hegemony. The Justifications for the 
Franco-Spanish War of 1635’ (2006) 8 Journal of the History of International Law 91-123 and 141-179 at 111-
23; SC Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A Historical Survey (CUP Cambridge 2005) 54-68 and 96-119. 
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contention. Moreover, the rise of the sovereign States devalued the role of Roman law as a 
common source of authority for international relations. By the mid-16
th
 century, the authority 
on which the medieval just gentium as part of the jus commune rested had collapsed. The 
kings and princes of Europe, who had achieved complete external sovereignty, were thrown 
upon their own devices, and their mutual agreements, to organise their relations. 
Nevertheless, many of the concepts and rules that came out of medieval jurisprudence were 
sustained in early-modern treaty practice and recycled – often through the mediating role of 
natural law – in early-modern doctrine. 




 centuries, peace treaties became less extensive again. 
For this, several explanations can be forwarded. First, common clauses were standardised, 




 centuries, new or renewed general 
laws about the state of war and of peace were developed under the newly emerging law of 
nations, both in practice and doctrine. By consequence, it became less necessary to spell them 
out in particular treaties. Moreover, for some clauses – such as the amnesty clause – it 
became generally accepted that it was automatically implied. Third, important aspects of the 
peaceful relations between States became the subject of separate treaties. From the late 17
th
 
century onwards, a separate Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation was often 
made. In the 18
th
 and particularly the 19
th
 century it became common to revive pre-war 
treaties on trade, navigation and others aspects of peaceful relations which has been 






 century onwards, large tracks of general international law were 
codified in multilateral conventions. In this, the peace treaties ending the Napoleon Wars 
acted as trailblazers. The Congres of Vienna introduced or codified general international law 
regarding slave trade, the status of international rivers and diplomats. Later, peace treaties 
were only rarely used in this way for the formation or codification of general international 
law outside the jus post bellum. However, the inclusion into the Versailles Peace Treaty and 
the other Parisian Peace Treaties at the end of World War I (1919/1920) of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations, which among others laid out a new jus ad bellum, should be 
mentioned. 
                                                 
23
 SC Neff, ‘Peace and Prosperity: Commercial aspects of peacemaking’ in Peace Treaties and International 
Law (n 5) 365-81; H Steiger, ‘Peace Treaties from Paris to Versailles’ in Peace Treaties and International Law 
(n 5) 59-99 at 94-6. 
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 Early-modern peace treaty practice built on the inheritance of classical Antiquity and 




 centuries) enhanced knowledge about 
Biblical, Greek and particular Roman practice through the humanists’ study of ancient 
historical (eg Livy) and rhetorical texts (eg Cicero).
24
 But the significance of this humanist 
rediscovery of Antiquity should not be overstated and certainly does not compare with the 
mediating role of late-medieval civilian and canon jurisprudence in the formation of the law 
of nations in general and the law of peacemaking in particular. The writers of the law of 
nations of the humanist period used ancient practices as exempla to illustrate their opinions 
rather than that those had a fundamental role in the formation thereof. 
 Between the 16
th
 and the 18
th
 centuries, the law of peacemaking through treaties found 
its place in doctrinal writings. The number of self-standing treatises on peace treaties 
remained very limited.
25
 Many of the general treatises on the laws of war and peace, such as 





contained reflections on peacemaking and peace treaties. In general, these were not all that 
elaborate or systematic. Until the 17
th
 century, many of the old topical issues which had 
dominated civilian and canon doctrine were still discussed, often beyond the point of their 




 centuries, it can 
be said that, with the exception of some doctrinal discussions such as the one on the 
exception of duress in case of peace treaties and the clausula rebus sic stantibus, doctrine was 
reflective of rather than constitutive for peace treaty practice. Among the classics of 
international law, the treatment of the law of peace treaties by Gentili as well as Christian 
Wolff (1679-1754) and Emer de Vattel (1714-67) stands out for length, depth and 
systematisation. With Wolff and Vattel, the doctrine of peace treaties had been largely laid 





                                                 
24
 KH Ziegler, ‘Römische Grundlagen des europäischen Völkerrechts’ (1971) 4 Ius commune 1-27 at 16-27. 
25
 Exceptions include P Gudelinus, De jure pacis commentarius (Dormalius Leuven 1620), see R Lesaffer, ‘An 
Early Treatise on Peace Treaties: Petrus Gudelinus between Roman Law and Modern Practice’ (2002) 23 
Journal of Legal History 223-52. 
26
 A Gentili, De jure belli libri tres 3.1 and 14-27 (1598 English transl. J Rolfe Classics of International Law 2 
vols. OUP Oxford 1933); C Wolff, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum (1749 English transl. JH 
Drake Classics of International Law 2 vols. Clarendon Oxford 1934); E de Vattel, Le droit des gens ou principes 
de la loi naturelle (1758 English transl. CG Fenwick Classics of International Law 3 vols. Carnegie Washington 
1916); R Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law 3 (3
rd
 edn 5 vols. Buttersworths London 1879-89) 
770-811; P. Fauchille, Traité de droit international public 2 (2 vols. Rousseau Paris 1921-3) 1030-59. See R 
Lesaffer, ‘Alberico Gentili’s ius post bellum and Early Modern Peace Treaties’ in B Kingsbury and B 
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 The main source of peace treaties were peace treaties themselves. Diplomats and 
jurists based themselves on previous peace treaties and copied many of the clauses found 
therein. Peace treaties themselves formed the usus and rendered proof of the opinio juris of 
the customary body of jus post bellum that emerged after 1500. One can distinguish several 
traditions of peace treaty practice according to the powers involved. Two traditions from 
before 1500 are foundational to subsequent peace treaty practice: the Italian practice and the 
practices of France, England and the Burgundian Netherlands. Through their wars in Italy 
after 1494 and through the personal union between the Burgundian Netherlands and Spain 
under the Habsburgs (1516), the two leading powers of the 16
th
 century, France and Spain, 
fell heir to these traditions. The major peace treaties of the 16
th
 century between these powers 
– Madrid (1526), Cambrai (1529), Crépy (1544), Câteau-Cambrésis (1559) and Vervins 
(1598) – further developed the laws and customs of peace treaties and laid the basis for the 
general European practice of later times. To these need to be added the contribution from 
treaties involving  England and the Republic to matters of navigation and trade and as well as 
that from the treaties of the Eighty Years War (1567-1648) between Spain and the Republic – 
in particular the Twelve Years Truce of 9 April 1609 and the Peace Treaty of Munster of 30 
January 1648 that was largely copied from the Truce – to matters of private property. The 




 centuries – 
Westphalia (1648), Nijmegen (1678/9), Ryswick (1697), Utrecht/Rastatt (1713/4), Aachen 
(1748), Paris/Hubertusburg (1763) – drew on these traditions and developed the general law 




4. Parties, forms and safeguards 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Straumann (eds) The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire 
(OUP Oxford 2010) 210-40; idem, ‘A Schoolmaster Abolishing Homework? Vattel on peacemaking and peace 
treaties’ in V Chetail and P Haggenmacher (eds) Vattel’s International Law in XXI
st
 Century Perspective/Le 
droit international de Vattel vu du XXI
e
 siècle (Brill Leyden/Boston 2011) 353-84.  
27
 J Fisch Krieg und Frieden im Friedensvertrag: Eine universalgeschichtliche Studie über die Grundlagen und 
Formelemente des Friedensschlusses (Klett-Cotta Stuttgart 1979) 536-7; R Lesaffer ‘Charles V, monarchia 
universalis and the Law of Nations (1515-1530)’ (2003) 71 Legal History Review 79-123; Gentili’s ius post 
bellum (n 26) 212-3; R Lesaffer and EJ Broers, ‘Private Property in the Dutch-Spanish Peace Treaty of Munster 
(30 January 1648) in M Jucker, M Kintzinger, RC Schwinges and B Stollberg-Rilinger (eds) Rechtsformen 
Internationaler Politik: Theorie, Norm und Praxis vom 12. bis 18. Jahrhundert (Zeitschrift für Historische 
Forschung Beihefte Duncker & Humblott Berlin 2011); Friedensvertrag von Crépy (n 19). 
12 
 
4.1 Treaty parties 
 
The emergence of the sovereign State after 1500 had a deep impact on peace treaties. By the 
17
th
 century, in all major States, the right to make war and peace had become the monopoly 
of the sovereign to the exclusion of all subject powers, the exceptions being the Estates of the 
German Empire and the northern Italian States, which fell under the feudal suzerainty of the 
emperor. For the late 15
th
 century, some examples can be quoted of peace treaties between 
French kings and their rebellious subjects.
28
 But the peace agreements made between the 
French kings and their subjects in the context of the French Wars of Religion (1562-98) were 
styled as unilateral concessions by the king and were laid down in the form of royal edicts.
29
 
After that, no regular peace treaties between princes and rebels can be found, except those 
ending in the successful secession of the rebels. 
 From the Middle Ages to the early 20
th
 century, the preambles of the peace treaties 
mentioned the princes and not their realms as contracting parties. The main articles in which 
the state of peace was restored stated that the peace would apply between the princes, their 
heirs and successors, lands and subjects.
30
 Until deep into the 18
th
 century, princes were 
mentioned by name and title; afterwards, by title.
31
 This was to some extent even paralleled 
in the case of Republics. The peace treaties entered by the Republic of the United Provinces 
mentioned the Estates-General, the highest sovereign body, as treaty partner and not the 
Republic itself.
32
 This would only change with the French Revolution.
33
  
Under this remarkable stability of form lurked an important change. After 1500, peace 
treaties gradually transformed from compacts between princes to public treaties between 
States. At the end of the 15
th
 century, peace treaties were still personal contracts which 
princes made in their own name. It was the princes, and not their realms or subjects, who 
were bound to the treaties. The latter were only indirectly bound through the mediation of 
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their princes and his promise to impose the treaty upon them. As princes claimed the 
monopoly of war and peace and of representing their realms on the international scene, they 
started to act as representatives of their realms, making their commitment suffice to bind their 
realms and subjects directly. By the mid-17
th
 century, this transformation was already well 
under way; peace treaty practice made this apparent in several ways.  
First, there was a subtle if significant change in the preambles. Until the end of the 
15
th
 century, the preambles of peace treaties expressly stated that princes entered the compact 
for themselves, their vassals and subjects.
34
 After 1500, these wordings disappeared and 
vassals and subjects were not mentioned anymore. This indicated that it was more readily 
accepted that the partaking of the prince to the treaty implied the allegiance of his subjects.  
Second, there is the question whether peace treaties were binding upon the successors 
of the signatories. It was generally accepted that a prince could bind his successors to a treaty, 




-century peace treaties 
stipulated that they would remain valid for a certain period of time after the dead of one of 
the signatories, during which his successor could ratify the treaty.
35
 These clauses 
disappeared by the 1530s. Others prescribed that the heir to the throne would co-ratify the 
treaty. This was largely restricted to treaties involving the cession of territories or rights.
36
 
Third, there was co-ratification. In treaties from the 14
th
 to the mid- 16
th
 century, it 
was customary for treaty partners to agree that the peace treaty would be co-ratified by 
certain nobles, clerics and towns subject to the signatory princes. This had a double function: 
it bound the notables more directly to the treaty; often, they also promised to act as 
guarantors for the execution of the treaty by their prince.
37
 Over the 16
th
 century, these 
clauses disappeared. In a limited number of peace treaties, they were first accompanied and 
later substituted by the promise to have the treaties registered by the highest courts, the 
exchequers or, exceptionally, the Estates, of the realm.
38
 This started as a form of 
institutionalised co-ratification, strengthening the allegiance of the realm to the treaty beyond 
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the mere engagement of the prince. Although these clauses have certainly acted as precedents 
to constitutional rules on the ratification of treaties by legislative assemblies which appeared 
at the end of the 18
th
 century, they are also fundamentally different. Whereas modern 
ratification by parliaments is an institution of national constitutional law, the early-modern 
involvement of representative and judicial organs was a matter of treaty law to strengthen the 
direct binding of a prince’s subjects to a treaty. The introduction of parliamentary ratification 
moreover marked a final step in the transformation of treaties from compacts between princes 
to treaties between States. 
 
4.2 Forms, ratification and safeguards 
 
The Reformation did not put an end to the ratification of treaties by oath. Until deep into the 
17
th
 century, the custom persisted. The Reformation, however, wrought an important change. 
By 1550, express references to canonical jurisdiction and sanctions had disappeared from 
peace treaties, even among Catholics. The Reformation destroyed the common authority 
under the binding character of treaties, that of canon law. The law of nations that began to 
emerge as an autonomous body of law had to provide a new one: ‘pacta sunt servanda’ and 
bona fides to one’s own consent. Under the new law of nations, ratification by oath was just 
another form of expressing the consent which bound a ruler to a treaty. Gradually, it was 
superseded and then totally replaced as the main constitutive element of the treaty by the 





 centuries, the mechanisms used to safeguard the peace 
evolved. Until the end of the 17
th
 century, most peace treaties expressly stipulated that a 
violation of the treaty by a subject would not lead to a breach of the peace, but that the 
perpetrator would be punished and restitution would be done.
39





 centuries often provided for the appointment of special commissioners or arbitrators to 




Before the Reformation, ecclesiastical jurisdiction and sanctions had been the 
strongest and most general mechanism to enforce the peace upon the treaty parties. The use 
of hostages was fairly uncommon and it was mainly used to guarantee the execution of 
                                                 
39
 Westminster (5 April 1654) Art. 24 3 CTS 225-56 at 234-5. 
40
 Munster (30 January 1648) Art. 21 1 CTS 5-6. 
15 
 
particular clauses in peace treaties, such as the surrender of territories, towns or fortresses or 
money payments. Sometimes, princes pledged all their goods to the treaty, thus giving the 
treaty partner a claim to lawfully seize these goods in case of a breach of treaty and the 
ensuing of a new war. By the mid-17
th
 century, these practices had largely fallen into disuse. 
Between the mid-17
th
 and the mid-18
th
 centuries, treaty partners frequently made use of 
guarantors. A guarantee implied that a power would enforce the treaty upon the treaty 
partners, if necessary through the use of force. A distinction can be made between guarantees 
from treaty partners and guarantees from third powers. The first form only makes sense for 
multilateral peace treaties, which were very uncommon until the mid-18
th
 century. The main 
exceptions are – seemingly – the two Peace Treaties of Westphalia (24 October 1648) – that 
of Munster between the Empire and France and of Osnabruck between the Empire and 
Sweden – to which not only the emperor and the kings of France, respectively Sweden, but 
also a great number of imperial Estates acceded.
41
 More frequent were guarantees by third 





 centuries invited the powers which had acted as mediators to become 
guarantors.
42
 Guarantees in peace treaties fell into disuse during the second half of the 18
th
 
century. Special treaties of guarantee whereby powers promised their support for the 
upholding of certain rights became more common over the 19
th
 century. That century also 
saw the emergence of new enforcement means for peace treaties, which would live on into 
the 20
th
 century. These were mostly of a military nature such as the (temporary) occupation 




5. Perpetual and general peace 
 
5.1 Perpetual peace 
 
Most peace treaties from the 16
th
 to the early 19
th
 century expressly stated that peace would 
be perpetual. This was not the – seemingly stubborn and naïve – expression of a legal 
commitment never to resort to war again, but held more specific implications under the law 
                                                 
41
 Munster (24 October 1648) Par. 124 1 CTS 271-356 at 354 and Osnabruck (24 October 1648) Art. 17.4 1 
CTS 119-269 at 187-8. 
42
 Nijmegen (10 August 1678) Art. 20 14 CTS 365-97 at 374. H Duchhardt, ‘Peace Treaties from Westphalia to 
the Revolutionary Era’ in Peace Treaties and International Law (n 5) 45-58 at 55. 
43
 Peace Treaties from Paris to Versailles (n 22) 91-2. 
16 
 
of nations. Already the medieval civilians had acknowledged that if a new war broke out 
between treaty partners for a new cause, other than the one underlying the previous war 
which had been settled in the peace treaty, this did not constitute a breach of the treaty.
44
 
From this, one can deduce a contrario that a peace treaty exhausted the right of the former 
belligerents to resort to armed force over the disputes settled in the peace. But it would take 
to Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), Wolff and Vattel to state it so straightforwardly.
45
 The 
perpetual character of a peace distinguished it from a truce. A truce could, as much as a peace 
treaty, put an end to all measures that had been taken at the inception of the war and thus for 
all practical purposes suspend the state of war and restore the state of peace, but parties had 
the right to resort to war for the same issues once the truce had lapsed.  
 
5.2 General peace 
 
Before the Peace of Aachen (1748), peace treaties were almost always bilateral.
46
 This was as 
true for peace treaties made at general, multilateral peace conferences. The Peace Treaties of 
Munster and Osnabruck (24 October 1648) were not truly exceptions to the rule. Their 
multilateral character was consequential to their hybrid nature: they were at once 
international peace pacts between the Empire and France or Sweden respectively as well as 
internal peace compacts between the emperor and the Estates of the Holy Roman Empire. As 
international peace compacts, they were not different from regular, bilateral peace treaties, 
both in form as in substance. Their much-acclaimed contribution to the development of the 
law of nations and the constitution of Europe stems from the fact that their hybrid nature 
caused constitutional settlements which pertained to the Empire to seep into international 
treaties and thus find their way into the law of nations.
47
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 Some peace treaties of the Early-Modern Age, particularly those coming out of 
multilateral peace conferences, were expressly said to inaugurate a ‘universal’ peace, under 
which term Christian Europe was meant.
48
 These claims to universality seem to be 
corroborated by the custom to ‘include’ numerous third powers into the treaties. But one 
should be careful not to overstate the implications of these inclusions. Inclusion clauses were 




 centuries and were certainly not 
limited to so-called universal peace treaties or peace treaties from multilateral conferences. 
With these clauses, treaty partners associated their allies and auxiliaries to the peace treaty. In 
some of the important peace treaties, almost all important powers were included. An in-depth 
study of diplomatic practice would have to show what the exact legal implications of 
inclusion were, but it is clear that it did not amount to full accession. The main effect of 
inclusion was that it committed the treaty partner not to enact retribution against the allies of 




 centuries, inclusion had most relevance in relation to 
auxiliary powers. Inclusion protected States which had supported a certain side in the war – 
with money or troops – without being openly at war. Inclusion did not make the whole treaty 
applicable to the included power nor granted it the same rights and imposed the same 
obligations – which would be impractical without particular negotiations – but extended the 
general clause of peace and amity to the included power. Inclusion did not suffice to restore 
peace between powers that were actually at war with one another. For this, a separate peace 
treaty or full accession to a peace treaty was necessary.
49
 




 centuries referred back to older peace treaties. 
This has been indicated in modern scholarship as proof for their constitutional role in the 
European States system. Until the end of the 17
th
 century, references to previous peace 
treaties as ‘base and foundation’ of a new treaty were largely restricted to the Holy Roman 
Empire. The first treaties to be mentioned thus way were the Westphalian Treaties.
 50
 This 
was in fact consequential to these Treaties having been declared imperial law.
51
 However, the 
practice took hold in international relations and became general in the 18
th
 century. The Peace 
Treaty of Paris of 10 February 1763 named the Treaties of Westphalia, Nijmegen, Ryswick, 
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Utrecht, Baden (1714), Vienna (1738), Aachen (1748) as well as the Triple and Quadruple 
Alliances (1717/8) and some particular treaties between Great Britain and Spain and Portugal 
and Spain as ‘base and foundation’.
52
 These treaties can indeed be considered ‘constitutional’ 
to the order of Europe to the extent that they settled major dynastic and territorial disputes 
and reflected some of the leading principles of European order. But, formally speaking, they 
were just regular treaties without any superior authority. In fact, in most cases it was 
expressly stated that these treaties were renewed and were to be held applicable as if they 
were inserted ‘word for word’ in the new treaty, at least inasmuch as it did not derogate from 
it.
53
 These older treaties were not paramount law in relation to the new treaty, as any special 
position they had derived from the new treaty. 
 The notion of ‘universal peace’ was yet in another way relevant. The preambles of 
peace treaties often indicate which ulterior purposes the treaty partners had in making peace. 
From the vast majority of peace treaties from the 15
th
 to the 20
th
 centuries, it appears that the 
powers of Europe considered a general peace within Christianity (15-18
th





 centuries) the ultimate purpose of their endeavours and their common 
responsibility. To this, the particular, generally bilateral peace treaty was said to contribute 
and treaty parties implicitly explained their willingness to grant concessions in these terms. 
The goal of general peace was associated with other goals or principles which evolved over 
time. In the 15
th
 and early 16
th
 centuries, it was linked to the need for unity of the Christian 




 centuries, mention was made 
of the ‘tranquillity and security of Europe’. This referred to the need to uphold the dynastic 
and territorial status quo as laid down in great peace compacts. Although express references 
to the balance of power were rare, it was considered a necessary precondition for the 
tranquillity and security of Europe.
54




 centuries, it became accepted 
that the great powers held a particular responsibility, and therefore special rights, to uphold 
the peace and security of Europe. The Triple and Quadruple Alliances of 1717-18 and some 
treaties of guarantee of the 18
th
 century offer early expressions thereof. In the 19
th
 century, 
the great powers assumed their role through the Congress of Europe, whereby regular 
multilateral conferences were convened to decide about major issues of peace and security 
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and wherein the great power took a dominant role. This ‘great power principle’ was later 
institutionalised in the Council of the League of Nations (1919) and the Security Council of 




6. Just and formal war, just and formal peace 
 
Under a consequential application of the just war doctrine, a just war needed to end in a just 
peace. Wolff and Vattel spelled out the multiple, far reaching consequences thereof. First, it 
meant that the unjust belligerent lost his claim to the object over which the war was fought. 
Second, he was liable for all the damages and costs suffered by the just belligerent because of 
the war. Under the just war doctrine, the unjust belligerent could not benefit from the full 
protection of the jus in bello; all hostile actions by the unjust belligerent were unjust actions 
for which he was liable. Third, also the just belligerent was liable for his unjust wartime 
actions – that are actions that went in against the laws of war.
56
 But Wolff and Vattel found 
this totally impractical as in most cases it was impossible to discern who held just cause and 
as it could not be expected that sovereigns would subject themselves to the judgment of their 
peers. As most writers had done since Grotius, Wolff and Vattel banished the justice of the 
war to the sphere of natural law, which was only enforceable in conscience. The externally 
enforceable law of nations only dealt with the question of the legality of the war. The peace 
that answered to such a formal or legal war would not have to deal with the question of 
justice but would be a compromise reached through negotiation and sanctioned by the 
consent of the parties. 
By applying the distinction between natural and positive law to just and legal war, 
Grotius – who built on the ideas of the Spanish neo-scholastics – and his successors gave 
both medieval traditions of the jus ad bellum, the canonical-theologian tradition of just war 
and the civilian tradition of legal war, a place in early-modern doctrine. But more to the 
point, this duality reflected the duplicity of reality. On the one hand, the doctrine of just war 
still held sway among the sovereign princes of Early-Modern Europe, as they continued to 
justify their wars in terms of the justice of their cause. Declarations and manifestos of war as 
                                                 
55
 R Lesaffer, ‘The Grotian Tradition Revisited: Change and continuity in the history of international law’ 
(2002) 73 British Yearbook of International law 103-39 at 133-5; States System of Europe (n 3) 321-30; G 
Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal sovereigns in the international legal order (CUP 
Cambridge 2004) 91-131. 
56
 Jus gentium (n 26) 8.986; Droit des gens (n 26) 4.2.18. 
20 
 
well as alliance treaties clearly drew on the traditions of just war. Some hostile measures 
against the enemy, such as the seizure of private property, were at least implicitly justified by 
the acclaimed justice of the war. But on the other hand, during war, belligerents applied the 
laws of war to all belligerents without any discrimination for the justice or injustice of their 
respective positions. Neither did claims to the justice of the war play any role in the making 
of peace, at least not among European sovereigns.
57
 In other words, the sovereign powers of 
Europe went to just war, fought a formal war and made a formal peace.  
Some examples of peace treaties which can be considered ‘just’ can be quoted from 
Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Generally but not exclusively, such peace treaties were only 
made after a clear victory or in the context of a hierarchical relation.
58
 Typically, such treaty 
contained an express judgment on the justice of the war and attributed the responsibility for 
the war to one of the belligerents. The concessions the ‘unjust’ side had to make came as a 
result of the injustice of his cause or actions during the war. Often compensations for the 
mere act of having fought an unjust war and/or for the damages and costs of the war were 
imposed, mostly in the form of a tribute. In some cases, restrictions on the military capacity 
of the unjust belligerent were provided, in order to prevent him from resorting to war again. 
None of the peace treaties between European sovereigns of the 16
th
 to early 20
th
 
centuries was of that type. In not a single peace treaty judgment was rendered on the justice 
of the war nor did a single treaty contain an attribution of guilt to one of the belligerents. In 
the preambles of peace treaties, the signatories most often limited themselves to deploring the 
war and the hardship it had brought in the most general of terms. This was different for part 
of the peace treaties made between European and non-European rulers. Particularly in the 
Americas, the European powers styled peace treaties as unilateral grants of peace. The 
treaties laid the blame for the war, which was often labelled a rebellion, at the doorstep of the 




The absence of any judgment on the justice of war meant that concessions could not 
be explained in terms of the injustice of a belligerent’s cause for war or the underlying claims 
about conceded rights and territories. Neither were express references made to a right of 
conquest – although this was often implied and the right of conquest was a contrario upheld 
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in some peace treaties.
60
 Hardly the only justifications which were ever offered, and very 
rarely so, were general references to the interest of a stable and enduring peace and 
friendship.
61
 The basis for treaty concessions was ultimately nothing but the consent of the 
parties.  
The refusal to judge was not restricted to the level of the jus ad bellum, but extended 
to the jus in bello. From the late 15
th
 century onwards, it became customary for the 
signatories to include a clause of amnesty and oblivion in the treaty. This implied that the 
signatories waived all claims for damages and costs because of the war, for themselves as 
well as for their subjects.
62
 By the beginning of the 19
th
 century, these clauses disappeared 
but by then it had become accepted that they were automatically implied.
63
 The amnesty 
clause tied in with another common stipulation, relating to the restitution of private property. 
During the Early-Modern Age, it was customary for the belligerents to seize the property of 
enemy subjects found on their territory. Under the just war doctrine, this was done to 
safeguard the future payment of the damages and the costs of war caused by the unjust 
belligerent. As peace treaties did not render judgment on the justice of war, the legal basis for 
their seizure collapsed. Therefore, most peace treaties included a general clause of automatic 








 century, the European law of nations with its practices and laws of 
peacemaking was but one of several regional systems. Other civilisations developed their 
own regional systems of peacemaking and peace treaties.  
 Since the 8
th
 century, the Latin West and the Islamic World had been in constant 
contact. The discoveries and the early empire-building by Europeans from the late 15
th
 
century onwards expanded the scope of Europe’s international relation to America, sub-
                                                 
60
 Dresden (28 July 1742) Art. 5 36 CTS 409-20 at 414-6; Paris (1763) Art. 23 42 CTS 296. S Korman, The 
Right of Conquest: The acquisition of territory by force in international law and practice (OUP Oxford 1996) 
67-73. 
61
 Paris (1763) Art. 7 42 CTS 288. 
62
 Krieg und Frieden (n 27) 92-123. 
63
 De jure belli ac pacis (n 21) 3.20.15; Jus gentium (n 26) 8.990; Droit des gens (n 26) 4.2.20. 
64
 H Neufeld, The International Protection of Private Creditors from the Treaties of Westphalia to the Congress 
of Vienna: A contribution to the history of the law of nations (Sijthoff Leyden 1971). 
22 
 
Sahara Africa and Asia. But for a long time, this did not lead to the expansion of the 
European legal order to other parts of the world. Instead, we can discern two different 
patterns of behaviour. First, in some cases, contacts and wars between Europeans and non-
Europeans led to the articulation of a peace treaty practice which built on the practices and 
laws of the two civilisations involved, forming a kind of supra-regional system particular to 
their mutual relations. This was the outcome when Europeans had to deal with powerful 
contenders, such as the Arab rulers in the Middle Ages, the Ottoman Empire or the princes 
and empires of India, East and South East Asia. Second, when Europeans powers were in a 
position to impose their will, as was often the case in the Americas or Africa, they imposed a 
particular design of treaties which was different from that used among European sovereigns. 
These often included attributions of guilt for the war as well as total subjection or the 
imposition of harsh conditions on the basis of the indigenous people’s one-sided 
responsibility for the conflict.
65
 
 The achievement of independence by the white settler colonies of America around 
1800 expanded the European law of nations and its system of peacemaking over the Atlantic. 
The Peace of Paris (1856) expressly stipulated that the Ottoman Empire would enjoy the 
advantages of the public law and the Concert of Europe.
66
 In the middle of the 19
th
 century, 
the European power and the United States forced China and Japan into their systems of 
international law and forced Western peace treaty practices upon them. The decolonisation of 
the 20
th
 century made Western international law and its peace treaty practices truly global. 
 
8. The transformation of peace treaty practice and law 
 
Versailles and the other Parisian peace treaties at the end of World War I (1919-20) mark a 
sudden break in European peace treaty practice. To some extent, they constitute a return to a 
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concept of just peace. Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty put the blame for the war on 
Germany because of its acts of aggression. Article 232 imposed upon Germany the obligation 
to pay compensation for all damage done to civilians and their property, as well as of the 
debts of Belgium to its allies for its war costs. In itself, the imposition of compensation for 
the costs and damages of war by the victor upon a defeated power were not new. They had 
been introduced during the Napoleonic Wars and had been provided for in important peace 
treaties such as those of Paris (1814/1815) and Frankfurt (1871).
67
 These compensations had 
in no way been related to an attribution of guilt for the war but were merely consequential to 
defeat. The return to a concept of ‘just peace’ went even further in the Versailles Peace 
Treaty. In the Treaty, the German Emperor was made liable for criminal prosecution for his 
‘supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties’ through his 
aggression (Art. 227). The Treaty also provided for the criminal prosecution by the Allied 
and Associated Powers of Germans for violations against the laws and customs of war (Art. 
228). Furthermore, it imposed severe military restrictions on Germany.
68
  
 The return to just peace was not set through after Versailles. Over the 20
th
 century, 
most interstate peace treaties were still formal peace treaties without attributions of guilt. But 
the peace treaties with the European allies of Germany (Paris 1947) after World War II 
applied a sort of concept of just peace. The same goes for the conditions for ending the 
hostilities imposed upon Iraq by the United Nations Security Council (Res. 687) at the end of 





-century peace practice saw more fundamental changes than this partial revival of 
just peace. First, the relative number of interstate armed conflicts ended by peace treaties 
seriously declined after 1945. In some cases, as that of Germany after World War II, this was 
due to political circumstances. But more generally, this decline was consequential to a change 
in the concept of war. The outlawry of war – in the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) and the UN 
Charter – has caused a sharp decline in the number of formally declared ‘legal wars’. Under 
the post-Charter jus ad bellum, the distinction between the state of war and a state of peace 
has become more relative and ‘wars’ are again perceived of in terms of separate acts of war 
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or hostility rather than an all-encompassing legal state. For this reason, the traditional peace 
treaty has fallen into relative disuse. But whereas this is often seen as the demise of peace 
treaty practice, it can as readily be considered part of a process of its transformation. Formal 
peace treaties marking the transit from state of war to state of peace may have become 
relatively rare but have not disappeared altogether.
70
 As legal forms and concepts of interstate 
armed conflict became more varied, legal forms and contents of agreements to end them 
likewise became more varied. Some conflicts ended with an armistice and/or a preliminary 
agreement whereby relations quickly or gradually regained a level of normalcy. In other 
cases, treaties of friendship organising aspects of the relations between belligerent were used 
without a formal end to the war being expressly declared.
71
  
 Second, the years since 1945 have been marked by a proliferation of intra-State armed 
conflicts, into which often third powers were involved. In this context, hundreds of peace 
agreements were made. These agreements often take the form of international treaties but are 
mostly of a hybrid nature, because they span inter- and intrastate affairs. More than being 
instruments of conflict resolution, current peace agreements are as much instruments of 
constitutional formation that break through the confines of domestic and international order. 
They include detailed regulations of constitutional (re-)formation.
72
 
 Third, next to State building, another important issue has come to expand the concern 
of peacemaking – or peace building as it is now called – and widened the domain of the jus 
post bellum: the protection of human rights. This has started with the inclusion of stipulations 




 By the late 20
th
 century, this has come to include 
stipulations on general human rights, including political and economic rights as well as on the 
prosecution of violations against international humanitarian law.
74
 
 Fourth, peacemaking turned into a drawn-out process of peace building, implying a 
series of agreements and documents. This is not completely new as also in the Early-Modern 
Age use was made of armistices and preliminary peace treaties in preparation of the peace 
treaty as well as particular treaties following up on different aspects of peacemaking. But 
then, there had always been a formal peace treaty at the centre which marked the 
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momentarily transit from war to peace. As war and peace have become relative concepts, so 




Early-Modern Europe developed a particular kind of peace treaty practice and law which was 
premised on the sovereign State in three ways. First, the sovereign State monopolised the 
right to make peace treaties. Second, a formal concept of war was introduced which excluded 
all notions of justice and discrimination on the basis of justice in the waging of war (jus in 
bello) and the making of peace (just post bellum). Third, the collapse of supra-State 
authorities gave consent through treaty a central role in the articulation of general as well as 
particular law of nations. Peace treaties naturally were most relevant to the development of 
the just post bellum. The 20
th
 century saw the relative demise of the sovereign State in 
international law and changed the law and practice of peacemaking. The traditional formal 
interstate peace treaty lost its quasi-monopoly as legal instrument of peacemaking. Instead a 
variety of peace agreements emerged. Moreover, the boundaries between inter- en intra-State 
peacemaking became transparent again and the just post bellum expanded into a just post 
bellum encompassing the protection of human rights and state building. 
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